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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 5458  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 7708  
IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 STATE 095073

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [IAEA](#) [IR](#) [PREL](#) [AORC](#)

SUBJECT: EXPANDING THE CHORUS ON IRAN

REF: STATE 91633

CLASSIFIED BY ISN VANN H. VAN DIEPEN, REASONS: 1.4 (B)  
AND (D).

¶1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST. PLEASE SEE  
PARAGRAPHS 10-30.

¶2. (C) SUMMARY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDING IRAN'S  
PROPOSAL OF SEPTEMBER 9 - SUGGEST THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT  
AIMS TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM'S NON-  
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND DEFUSE  
GROWING PRESSURE FOR ADDITIONAL PUNITIVE MEASURES AHEAD  
OF THE OPENING SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA)  
AND THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE. KEY TO COUNTERING  
IRAN'S EFFORTS WILL BE EXPANDING ITS SENSE OF  
INCREASING ISOLATION ON THE ISSUE, SPECIFICALLY BY  
ALLIES AND PARTNERS, AND IN PARTICULAR ENLISTING  
MODERATE MEMBERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT TO CALL ON  
IRAN TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE P5+1 OFFER TO  
ENGAGE, OR RISK NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES. DEPARTMENT  
REQUESTS AMBASSADORS AT ADDRESSEE POSTS TO PERSUADE HOST  
GOVERNMENTS' SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES TO DELIVER SUCH A  
MESSAGE AT THE UNGA OPENING SESSION AND IAEA MEETINGS;  
HOWEVER, POSTS ARE ALSO ENCOURAGED TO ENGAGE ALL  
RELEVANT HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO PRESS IRAN IN  
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CHANNELS. END SUMMARY.

¶3. (C) OBJECTIVE: TO PROVIDE HOST GOVERNMENTS WITH  
SUGGESTED KEY MESSAGES TO DELIVER TO IRAN ABOUT THE  
SEVERITY OF SPURNING THE P5+1 AND THE REAL POSSIBILITY  
OF ADDITIONAL, HARSHER SANCTIONS. DEPENDING ON THE  
COUNTRY, THESE MESSAGES MAY BE DELIVERED IN PUBLIC FORA,  
PRIVATE CHANNELS, OR BOTH. COUNTRY SPECIFIC  
INSTRUCTIONS ARE IN PARAGRAPHS 10-30.

¶4. (U) BACKGROUND: EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE UNITED STATES  
AND OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND  
GERMANY OFFERED IRAN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT  
NEGOTIATIONS TO ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE  
IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM WITHOUT ANY PRE-CONDITIONS. IN  
THE ENSUING MONTHS, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUED ITS  
NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN VIOLATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL  
RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE. AS A  
CONSEQUENCE, PRESIDENT OBAMA, SECRETARY CLINTON AND OUR  
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS NOTED IN RECENT WEEKS THAT WE  
WILL SOON TAKE STOCK OF THE SITUATION AND BEGIN TO  
CONSIDER INTENSIFYING PRESSURE ON IRAN IN RESPONSE TO  
ITS CONTINUED NON-COMPLIANCE.

¶5. (U) IN LATE AUGUST, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SUDDENLY  
ALLOWED LIMITED IAEA INSPECTION VISITS OF TWO NUCLEAR  
FACILITIES AT NATANZ AND ARAK. WHILE THIS CONSTITUTED  
SOME PROGRESS, THE IAEA ITSELF NOTED THAT THE  
INSPECTIONS FELL FAR SHORT OF MEETING IRAN'S OBLIGATIONS  
TO THE IAEA (REFTEL). MOREOVER, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT  
CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO COOPERATE WITH THE IAEA IN  
ANSWERING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE MILITARY

DIMENSIONS OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. ON SEPTEMBER 9, IRAN PROVIDED ITS PROPOSAL IN RESPONSE TO THE P5+1'S OFFER TO MEET FROM APRIL 2009. THIS PROPOSAL IS STILL BEING ASSESSED, IN CONSULTATION WITH OUR P5+1 PARTNERS (FURTHER DISCUSSED IN PARA 9 BELOW).

¶6. (C) THESE RECENT EFFORTS, IN ADDITION TO THE 9 SEPTEMBER IRANIAN RESPONSE, SUGGEST THAT IRAN AIMS TO BLUNT GROWING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM BY CREATING A MORE COOPERATIVE IMAGE WHILE AVOIDING FULL OR EVEN PARTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL DEMANDS. INTERNATIONAL REACTION SO FAR INDICATES THAT THE TACTICS MAY HAVE SOME RESONANCE WITH SOME MEMBERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, PARTICULARLY AMONG THOSE WHO FEAR THAT POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS ON THEIR RIGHTS TO CIVILIAN USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY OUTWEIGH ANY RISK THEY MAY FACE FROM A NUCLEAR-WEAPONS CAPABLE IRAN.

¶7. (C) OUR CHALLENGE IS TO CONVINCE ALLIES AND PARTNERS, PARTICULARLY MODERATES IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT AND TANGIBLE RISKS TO THEIR INTERESTS IN ALLOWING IRAN TO EVADE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. SPECIFICALLY, CONTINUED IRANIAN NON-COMPLIANCE COULD:

-- FORCE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS TO CONSIDER MORE STRINGENT CONTROLS ON TRANSFERS TO NUCLEAR CONSUMERS, POTENTIALLY IMPEDING THEIR OWN FUTURE ACCESS TO NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

STATE 00095073 002 OF 008

AND COOPERATION;

-- PROMPT SIGNIFICANTLY STRONGER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND NONPROLIFERATION SANCTIONS THAT WILL RISK COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO COUNTRIES WITH TRADE AND FINANCIAL LINKS WITH IRAN;

-- RAISE TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RISKING INCREASED MILITARIZATION AND THREATS OF PRE-EMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION; AND

-- (AS APPLICABLE FOR ENERGY-IMPORTING COUNTRIES) RISK DRAMATICALLY INCREASED ENERGY PRICES.

¶8. (U) THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN HELP AVOID THESE RISKS BY ENCOURAGING IRAN TO RESPOND SERIOUSLY TO PRESIDENT OBAMA'S AND OUR P5+1 PARTNERS' OFFER TO ENGAGE, AND TO BRING ITSELF INTO COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR OBLIGATIONS. OUR GOAL IN APPROACHING HOST GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE TO PERSUADE THESE STATES TO CALL ON IRAN, BOTH PRIVATELY AND IN PUBLIC, TO AVOID CONFRONTATION BY ACCEPTING A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AND FULFILLING ITS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ACKNOWLEDGE IRAN'S RIGHTS TO THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY UNDER THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY, WHILE NOTING THAT WITH THESE RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR ADDRESSEE GOVERNMENTS TO REINFORCE THIS MESSAGE VIA THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE (14-18 SEPTEMBER) AS WELL AS DURING THE OPENING SESSION OF THE UNGA (22-25 SEPTEMBER). IF WE CANNOT SECURE PUBLIC STATEMENTS, WE SHOULD PRESS FOR STRONG PRIVATE APPROACHES ON THE MARGINS OF THESE MEETINGS.

¶9. (U) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS. POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO:

--PERSUADE HOST GOVERNMENTS' SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES TO DELIVER MESSAGES AT THE UNGA OPENING SESSION AND IAEA MEETINGS;

--ENGAGE OTHER RELEVANT HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO PRESS IRAN IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CHANNELS;

--COMPLIMENT GOVERNMENTS, AS APPROPRIATE, ON THEIR IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS STATEMENTS;

--TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO FRAME THESE POINTS IN WAYS THAT WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO HOST GOVERNMENTS THE POLITICAL GAIN

THEY COULD DERIVE FROM SUCH STANCES, AS WELL AS CALL ON HOST GOVERNMENTS TO AMPLIFY OUR EFFORTS BY PRESSING THEIR OTHER ALLIES TO JOIN IN THE CHORUS.

IF ASKED ABOUT THE IRANIAN PROPOSAL DELIVERED ON 9 SEPTEMBER 2009, POSTS CAN RESPOND:

--WE AND OUR P5+1 PARTNERS HAVE RECEIVED IRAN'S PROPOSAL AND ARE STUDYING IT.

--WE ARE ALL COMMITTEED TO MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAN TO RESOLVE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S CONCERNS ABOUT IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

--WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE EU WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE IRANIANS, ON BEHALF OF THE P5+1, TO ARRANGE A FACE-TO-FACE MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

--THE IRANIAN PROPOSAL DOES NOT COVER THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, WHICH IS PRECISELY WHY WE NEED AN EARLY MEETING.

--BUT, WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN TALKING FOR THE SAKE OF TALKING. ANY DIALOGUE MUST BE MEANINGFUL AND PRODUCE CONCRETE RESULTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

POSTS CAN OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE INADEQUACY OF IRAN'S ACTIONS TO DATE IN REFTEL.

¶10. (U) ADDITIONALLY, POSTS MAY WISH TO ENGAGE HOST GOVERNMENTS ON IRAN'S POOR HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, ESPECIALLY IN CASES WHERE THE NONPROLIFERATION ISSUE MAY NOT RESONATE TO THE SAME DEGREE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES WOULD.

¶11. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS WITHOUT SPECIFIC GUIDANCE BELOW: ALL POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO ADVISE DEPARTMENT OF ANY OTHER VENUES, MEETINGS, OR FORA WHERE THE MESSAGE IN THESE TALKING POINTS AND IN REFTEL COULD BE DEPLOYED. POSTS ARE ALSO REQUESTED TO ADVISE DEPARTMENT IF IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO DEPLOY A SIMILAR DEMARCHE IN THAT COUNTRY. FINALLY, ALL POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS IN THEIR HOST COUNTRY DURING ROUTINE EXCHANGES AND, AS APPROPRIATE, TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO PRESS IRAN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY BEFORE IT:

STATE 00095073 003 OF 008

--NOTE THAT THE UNITED STATES REMAINS INTERESTED IN FINDING A DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION TO INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS WITH IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE P5+1 OFFERED IRAN SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY IN APRIL 2009 BY INVITING IRAN TO MEET WITH THE GROUP, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, TO DISCUSS MUTUAL CONCERNS IN MUTUAL RESPECT.

-- THE UNITED STATES AND ITS PARTNERS IN THE P5+1 ARE REVIEWING THE IRANIAN PROPOSAL, ALTHOUGH NOTING THAT IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM. IN THE MEANTIME, IRAN CONTINUES TO DEFY MULTIPLE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND REFUSES TO FULLY COOPERATE WITH THE IAEA ON ITS INVESTIGATION INTO IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

-- IRAN SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED TO IT WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY.

-- IRAN CONTINUES TO COMMIT GROSS VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF ITS PEOPLE AND TO DENY THEIR BASIC FREEDOMS. WE CALL UPON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO COOPERATE IN ENCOURAGING IRAN TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS, IRAN HAS IN PARTICULAR VIOLATED ITS PEOPLE'S RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, EXPRESSION, AND OF THE PRESS. HUNDREDS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS REMAIN JAILED FOR EXPRESSING THEIR SUPPORT FOR OTHER POLITICAL CANDIDATES AND FOR QUESTIONING THE INTEGRITY OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.

POST-SPECIFIC POINTS

¶12. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSIES LONDON AND PARIS: POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO ENCOURAGE THE U.K. AND FRANCE TO SEND SIMILAR MESSAGES TO THE COUNTRIES LISTED BELOW OR TO COUNTRIES WITH WHICH EACH HAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP.

¶13. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSIES BANGKOK, HANOI, AND MANILA: POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT INTERLOCUTORS TO REQUEST THAT PHILIPPINE, THAI, AND VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS SEND A STRONG PRIVATE MESSAGE TO IRANIAN OFFICIALS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND TO ENCOURAGE IRAN TO GIVE A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO THE P5+1. YOU SHOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE THEM TO GIVE STRONG STATEMENTS DURING THE UNGA GENERAL DEBATE. AS IMPORTANT MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN), THESE THREE COUNTRIES HAVE DEMONSTRATED A STRONG COMMITMENT TO NONPROLIFERATION AND THE UN, INCLUDING THE UNSC. POSTS SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT STRONG, UNITED INTERNATIONAL ACTION ON THIS ISSUE IS CRITICAL TO DEAL WITH THE NUCLEAR THREAT, WHETHER IT IS FROM A COUNTRY LIKE IRAN OR THE DPRK. KEY MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE THAILAND, THE PHILIPPINES, AND VIETNAM TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- SUPPORT IRAN'S RIGHT TO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ASSUMED.
- NOTE THEIR OWN COMMITMENT TO THE NPT AND TO THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME MORE GENERALLY, AND HOW RIGHTS IN THIS REGIME CARRY OBLIGATIONS.
- UNDERScore THAT WITH SUCH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES, INCLUDING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO FULFILL THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.
- EXPRESS CONCERN THAT, SHOULD IRAN DECIDE NOT TO SERIOUSLY ENGAGE WITH THE P5+1/E3+3, IT WILL LIKELY FACE ADDITIONAL, HARSHER SANCTIONS.
- COOPERATION IS MUCH MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THAN ISOLATION.

¶14. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSIES IN GCC+3 COUNTRIES: YOU ARE REQUESTED TO URGE HOST GOVERNMENTS TO USE UPCOMING OPPORTUNITIES AT THE UNGA, INCLUDING STATEMENTS ISSUED FROM GCC/GCC+3 MEETINGS, TO PUBLICLY VOICE SHARED CONCERN ABOUT IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND ITS ACTIVITIES THAT THREATEN REGIONAL SECURITY. PRIVATE MESSAGES ARE USEFUL BUT NOT ENOUGH; KEY PARTNERS SUCH AS JORDAN, EGYPT, UAE, AND KSA SHOULD TAKE A MORE PUBLIC APPROACH TO EXPRESS OUR SHARED CONCERNS, PARTICULARLY AS THEY COULD BE DIRECTLY IMPACTED BY THE REPERCUSSIONS OF ANY MILITARY STRIKE. WE HOPE THESE GOVERNMENTS WILL ACTIVELY SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE IRANIAN CHALLENGE. YOU SHOULD REASSURE HOST GOVERNMENTS THAT AS WE MOVE FORWARD ON OUR IRAN POLICY, WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT AND COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH THEM. MESSAGES INCLUDE:

STATE 00095073 004 OF 008

- STRESS THAT THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAS A KEY ROLE IN THIS ISSUE BECAUSE OF ITS PROXIMITY TO IRAN AND SHOULD EXPRESS ITS CONCERN TO IRAN IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM THREATEN REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY, AND WITH IT THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY.
- IRAN HAS AN OPPORTUNITY BEFORE IT TO ACHIEVE A DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION OF THESE CONCERNS, AND CAN AVOID HARSHER SANCTIONS MEASURES IN SO DOING.
- IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF IRAN'S ECONOMY AND PEOPLE TO AVOID THAT PATH. DOING SO WOULD IMPROVE IRAN'S STANDING IN THE REGION AND STEM THE GROWING DIVIDE CAUSED BY MISTRUST OF IRANIAN INTENTIONS.

¶15. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY ACCRA: BUILDING ON THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PRESIDENT OBAMA'S RECENT TRIP AND OUR PAST GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP IN VIENNA, EMBASSY ACCRA SHOULD ENCOURAGE GHANA TO USE ITS POSITION IN THE NAM AND BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN TO DELIVER CLEAR, EVEN IF PRIVATE, MESSAGES ON THE MARGINS OF UNGA THAT MEMBERS OF THE NAM WILL NOT RUBBER-STAMP IRAN'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS. MESSAGES THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE GHANIANIANS TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S RIGHT TO THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ASSUMED.
- UNDERScore TO IRAN THAT YOU STAND WITH IRAN IN DEFENSE OF THAT PRINCIPLE, BUT EMPHASIZE THAT WITH SUCH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
- STRESS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS AND ANSWERS TO THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS POSED BY THE IAEA, IT SEEMS VERY LIKELY THAT IRAN WILL BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AND PRESSURE.
- URGE IRAN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY IT HAS BEEN OFFERED TO ENGAGE SERIOUSLY WITH THE P5+1/E3+3 TO RESOLVE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

¶16. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY ANKARA: EMBASSY ANKARA IS REQUESTED TO URGE TURKEY TO USE UPCOMING OPPORTUNITIES AT THE UNGA GENERAL DEBATE TO PUBLICLY VOICE OUR SHARED CONCERN ABOUT IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. PRIVATE MESSAGES ARE USEFUL BUT NOT ENOUGH AND WE NEED TO URGE TURKEY TO TAKE A MORE PUBLIC APPROACH TO EXPRESS OUR SHARED CONCERNS. MESSAGES THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE TURKS TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- STRESS TO TURKEY THAT IT HAS A KEY ROLE IN THIS ISSUE BECAUSE OF ITS PROXIMITY TO IRAN AND SHOULD EXPRESS ITS CONCERN TO IRAN THAT ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM THREATENS REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY, AND WITH IT THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY. NOTE CONCERN THAT TENSION IN THE REGION MAY CAUSE AN ALREADY DELICATE SECURITY SITUATION TO UNRAVEL. IRANIAN REFUSAL TO ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS WITH ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS CONTRIBUTING TO REGIONAL UNEASE AND DESTABILIZATION, WHICH IS IN NO ONE'S INTERESTS.
- IRAN HAS AN OPPORTUNITY BEFORE IT TO ACHIEVE A DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION OF THESE CONCERNS AND TO AVOID FURTHER SANCTIONS IN SO DOING.
- IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF IRAN'S ECONOMY AND PEOPLE TO AVOID THAT PATH.
- IRAN SHOULD TAKE SERIOUSLY PRESIDENT OBAMA'S OFFER OF ENGAGEMENT AND RESOLVE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE THROUGH DIRECT, SUBSTANTIVE DIPLOMACY WITH THE P5+1/E3+3.

¶17. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY ASTANA: POST IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT INTERLOCUTORS TO REQUEST THAT KAZAKH OFFICIALS SEND STRONG PRIVATE MESSAGES TO IRANIAN OFFICIALS. THIS ALSO CAN BE RAISED ON THE MARGINS OF UNGA. AS A LEADER ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES, KAZAKHSTAN'S DECISION TO RENOUNCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROVIDES A POWERFUL EXAMPLE FOR IRAN. KAZAKHSTAN ALSO COULD USEFULLY STRESS HOW GROWING BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN KAZAKHSTAN AND IRAN AS WELL AS CONTINUED STABILITY IN THE CASPIAN REGION, WHICH BOTH COUNTRIES VALUE, ARE IMPERILED BY IRAN'S OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR AMBITIONS. KEY MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE THE KAZAKHS TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- KAZAKHSTAN HAS MADE CLEAR IT SUPPORTS IRAN'S RIGHT TO NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.
- HOWEVER, IRAN SHOULD DEVELOP ITS CIVIL NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN A TRANSPARENT MANNER TO ASSURE THE REST OF THE WORLD OF ITS PEACEFUL INTENTIONS.
- MOREOVER, KAZAKHSTAN WOULD STRONGLY SUPPORT IRAN'S RIGHT TO BENEFIT FROM A NUCLEAR FUEL BANK SUCH AS



ONE THE GOVERNMENT OF KAZAKHSTAN HAS PROPOSED TO HOST.

- IRANIAN ACCESS TO SUCH A RESERVE WOULD MAKE IRAN'S ENRICHMENT PROGRAM UNNECESSARY.
- STRESS THAT KAZAKHSTAN WANTS TO CONTINUE TO EXPAND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN, BUT THIS EFFORT WILL BE IMPEDED UNTIL IRAN ADDRESSES THE CONCERNS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
- EMPHASIZE THE BENEFITS OF ACCEPTING THE P5+1/E3+3 PACKAGE, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES.

¶18. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY BRASILIA: EMBASSY BRASILIA IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH THE APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO URGE THE BRAZILIANS TO USE THEIR STATEMENT AT UNGA TO PRESS IRAN TO FULFILL ITS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING IRAN'S NPT RIGHTS. IN THE PAST, BRAZIL HAS BEEN WILLING TO REGISTER VIEWS WITH IRAN THAT, WHILE NOT IDEAL, BEAR SOME SIMILARITY TO OUR OWN VIEWS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT BRAZIL WOULD PUBLICLY SPECULATE ON THE NEED FOR NEW SANCTIONS ON IRAN, BUT BRAZILIAN RHETORIC REGARDING RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES COULD USEFULLY REINFORCE OUR OWN MESSAGES. MESSAGES THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE BRAZILIANS TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- IRAN HAS RIGHTS, BUT WITH THEM COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
- THESE RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE ADHERING TO ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS REGARDING TRANSPARENCY INTO ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM.
- URGE IRAN TO THINK ABOUT THE WELL-BEING OF ITS ECONOMY AND PEOPLE IN THIS REGARD AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESOLVE THIS DISPUTE IN A MANNER THAT PROVIDES FOR THEIR DEVELOPMENT.

¶19. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY JAKARTA: EMBASSY JAKARTA IS REQUESTED TO URGE INDONESIA TO 'SOUND THE ALARM' TO IRAN ON SANCTIONS DURING PRIVATE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE MARGINS OF UNGA, DURING NAM MEETINGS, AND/OR AT THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE. KEY MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE INDONESIA TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- SUPPORT IRAN'S RIGHT TO THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT OBLIGATIONS INTO WHICH IT ENTERED FREELY.
- UNDERScore THAT WITH SUCH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
- EXPRESS CONCERN THAT, SHOULD IRAN NOT ENGAGE IN A MEANINGFUL WAY WITH THE P5+1/E3+3 SO AS TO RESOLVE INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM, IT WILL LIKELY FACE ADDITIONAL, HARSHER SANCTIONS.
- NOTE THAT AS A MEMBER OF THE NAM, INDONESIA DOES NOT WISH TO SEE IRAN SUFFER ANY FURTHER CONSEQUENCES OF UN SANCTIONS OR FRICTION WITHIN THE NAM, WHICH WOULD OCCUR IF IRAN FAILS TO ADDRESS THESE CONCERNS DIPLOMATICALLY.
- EMPHASIZE THE BENEFITS OF ACCEPTING THE P5+1/E3+3 PACKAGE, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION,
- UNDERScore THAT COOPERATION IS MUCH MORE LIKELY TO RESULT IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THAN ISOLATION.

¶20. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY KAMPALA: EMBASSY KAMPALA IS REQUESTED TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO USE ITS POSITION IN THE NAM AND THE UNSC, AS WELL AS ITS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN, TO DELIVER CLEAR, EVEN IF PRIVATE, MESSAGES THAT MEMBERS OF THE NAM WILL NOT RUBBER-STAMP IRAN'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS. APPEALS TO THE UGANDAN PRESIDENT'S ROLE AS A REGIONAL STATESMAN AND POSITION ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL MAY ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE OR STRENGTHEN IT. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, UGANDA SHOULD MAKE SOME SUBTLE POINT DURING ITS BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAN ON THE MARGINS OF UNGA AND/OR THE IAEA GC.

KEY MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE UGANDA TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S RIGHT TO THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ASSUMED.
- ACKNOWLEDGE THAT UGANDA WILL STAND WITH IRAN IN DEFENSE OF THAT RIGHT, BUT UNDERScore THAT WITH SUCH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
- STRESS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS, IT SEEMS VERY LIKELY THAT IRAN WILL BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AND PRESSURE.
- URGE IRAN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS NEW OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE THE P5+1/E3+3 TO RESOLVE THE NUCLEAR

STATE 00095073 006 OF 008

ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

¶21. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR: EMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH THE APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT INTERLOCUTORS TO REQUEST THAT MALAYSIA BALANCE FURTHER ITS COMMENTS ON THE IRAN ISSUE, PARTICULARLY IN PRIVATE ENGAGEMENTS WITH IRAN, IN THE NAM, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE IAEA BOARD, AND IN PUBLIC COMMENTS AT UNGA. KEY MESSAGES THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE MALAYSIANS TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- NOTE THE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN'S RIGHT TO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ASSUMED.
- UNDERScore THAT WITH SUCH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
- HIGHLIGHT THAT IRAN HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO AUGMENT AND IMPROVE ITS COOPERATION WITH THE IAEA TO ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS AND SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE P5+1 OFFER.
- IRAN HAS AN IMPORTANT, HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY BEFORE IT TO AVOID CONTINUED ISOLATION AND SANCTIONS, BUT IT WILL NOT LAST FOREVER IRAN MUST AFFIRMATIVELY CHOOSE A POSITIVE PATH.

¶22. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR MEXICO: EMBASSY MEXICO IS REQUESTED TO URGE MEXICO TO CONSIDER QUIETLY RAISING A RED FLAG IN PRIVATE WITH THE IRANIANS DURING THEIR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AT UNGA, DURING NAM MEETINGS, AS A NON-PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNSC, AND AT THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND GENERAL CONFERENCE. KEY MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE MEXICO TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- IRAN HAS RIGHTS, BUT WITH THEM COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
- THESE RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE RESPONDING TO THE LAWFUL REQUESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY INTO IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, CONSISTENT WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.
- URGE IRAN TO THINK ABOUT THIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO INCREASE THE WELL-BEING OF ITS PEOPLE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ITS ECONOMY.

¶23. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY MONROVIA: BUILDING ON THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LIBERIA, EMBASSY MONROVIA SHOULD ENCOURAGE LIBERIA TO USE ITS POSITION IN THE NAM AND BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN TO DELIVER CLEAR, MESSAGES ON THE MARGINS OF UNGA THAT MEMBERS OF THE NAM WILL NOT RUBBER-STAMP IRAN'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS. MESSAGES THAT WE WOULD LIKE THE LIBERIA TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S RIGHT TO THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ASSUMED.
- STRESS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS AND ANSWERS TO THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS POSED BY THE IAEA, IT SEEMS VERY LIKELY THAT IRAN WILL BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS

AND PRESSURE.

- URGE IRAN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY IT HAS BEEN OFFERED TO SERIOUSLY ENGAGE THE P5+1/E3+3 TO RESOLVE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
- NOTE THAT COOPERATION IS MUCH MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THAN ISOLATION.

¶24. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY NEW DELHI: EMBASSY NEW DELHI IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND ENCOURAGE INDIA TO SEND STRONG PRIVATE MESSAGES TO IRANIAN OFFICIALS. THIS CAN ALSO BE RAISED ON THE MARGINS OF UNGA. DUE TO INDIA'S OWN LACK OF NPT STATUS, A FOCUS ON RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE; HOWEVER, INDIA COULD INSTEAD FOCUS ON THE STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND APPEAL TO THE NEED FOR IRAN TO ABIDE BY THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ENTERED IN TO IN ORDER TO AVOID FURTHER SANCTIONS. INDIA COULD ALSO USEFULLY STRESS HOW BUSINESS INTERACTIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND IRAN, WHICH BOTH COUNTRIES VALUE, ARE BEING JEOPARDIZED BY IRAN'S OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR AMBITIONS. KEY MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE THE INDIANS TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- EXPRESS CONCERN THAT, SHOULD IRAN DECIDE NOT TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH THE P5+1/E3+3, IT WILL LIKELY FACE ADDITIONAL, HARSHER SANCTIONS. INDIA WOULD LIKE TO EXPAND ITS ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN, BUT SUCH EFFORTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE IMPEDED UNTIL IRAN ADDRESSES THE CONCERNS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

STATE 00095073 007 OF 008

- EMPHASIZE THE BENEFITS OF ACCEPTING THE P5+1/E3+3 PACKAGE.
- ADVISE IRAN THAT COOPERATION IS MUCH MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO OVERALL DEVELOPMENT THAN ISOLATION.

¶25. (C) ACTION REQUEST FOR OUAGADOUGOU: EMBASSY OUGADOUGOU IS REQUESTED TO ENCOURAGE BURKINA FASO TO USE ITS POSITION IN THE NAM AND THE UNSC, AS WELL AS ITS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN, TO DELIVER CLEAR, EVEN IF PRIVATE, MESSAGES THAT MEMBERS OF THE NAM WILL NOT RUBBER-STAMP IRAN'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS. APPEALS TO THE BURKINA FASO PRESIDENT'S ROLE AS A REGIONAL STATESMAN MAY ENCOURAGE BURKINA FASO TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE OR STRENGTHEN IT. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, BURKINA FASO SHOULD MAKE SOME SUBTLE POINT DURING ITS BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAN ON THE MARGINS OF UNGA AND/OR THE IAEA GC. KEY MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE BURKINA FASO TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- (SBU) EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S RIGHT TO THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ASSUMED.
- (SBU) ACKNOWLEDGE THAT BURKINA FASO WILL STAND WITH IRAN IN DEFENSE OF THAT RIGHT, BUT UNDERSCORE THAT WITH SUCH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
- (SBU) STRESS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS, IT SEEMS VERY LIKELY THAT IRAN WILL BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AND PRESSURE.
- (SBU) URGE IRAN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS NEW OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE SERIOUSLY WITH THE P5+1/E3+3 TO RESOLVE THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

¶26. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY PRETORIA: EMBASSY PRETORIA IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND URGE THEM TO CONSIDER QUIETLY RAISING A RED FLAG IN PRIVATE WITH THE IRANIANS DURING THEIR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AT UNGA, DURING NAM MEETINGS, AND AT THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND GENERAL CONFERENCE. SOUTH AFRICA COULD ALSO HELP INFLUENCE IBISA PARTNERS BRAZIL AND INDIA. EMBASSY PRETORIA IS ALSO REQUESTED TO ENCOURAGE AMBASSADOR MINTY TO USE HIS SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE WITHIN THE NAM AND WITH IRAN TO IMPRESS UPON IRANIAN OFFICIALS THE VALUE OF THE



OPPORTUNITY IN FRONT OF IT AND THE RISKS OF FAILING TO COOPERATE. AMBASSADOR MINTY'S STATEMENTS AT THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS ARE KEENLY READ BY NAM STATES; MINTY SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO USE HIS INFLUENCE CAREFULLY TO CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS. ANY APPROACH SHOULD ALSO BUILD CONSTRUCTIVELY ON THE RECENT U.S-SOUTH AFRICA BILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION DIALOGUE LED BY SPECIAL ADVISOR ROBERT EINHORN IN AUGUST. KEY MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S RIGHT TO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ASSUMED.
- UNDERScore THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE NAM AND SOUTH AFRICA WILL STAND WITH IRAN IN DEFENSE OF THAT RIGHT, BUT THAT WITH SUCH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
- NOTE CONCERN, HOWEVER, THAT SHOULD IRAN NOT SERIOUSLY ENGAGE WITH THE P5+1/E3+3, AS IT HAS SAID IT SUPPORTS DOING, IT WILL FACE ADDITIONAL, EVEN HARSHER SANCTIONS.
- IT IS NOT HELPFUL FOR THERE TO BE FURTHER FRICTION WITHIN THE NAM, WHICH WOULD OCCUR IF IRAN FAILS TO ADDRESS THESE CONCERNS DIPLOMATICALLY.
- AS A FELLOW MEMBER OF THE NAM, SOUTH AFRICA DOES NOT WISH TO SEE IRAN CONTINUALLY SUFFER THE CONSEQUENCES OF ESCALATING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.
- ENGAGING IN A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE ABOUT IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM WILL BE AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS RESOLVING THIS ISSUE AND RETURNING IRAN TO PROSPERITY AND GREATER ACCEPTANCE WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

127. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR SAN JOSE: EMBASSY SAN JOSE IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND URGE THAT COSTA RICA CONSIDER QUIETLY RAISING A RED FLAG IN PRIVATE WITH THE IRANIANS DURING THEIR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AT UNGA IN ITS CAPACITY AS A NON-PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNSC, AND/OR AT THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE. KEY MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE COSTA RICA TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- IRAN HAS RIGHTS, BUT WITH THEM COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
- THESE RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE RESPONDING TO THE

STATE 00095073 008 OF 008

LAWFUL REQUESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY INTO IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, CONSISTENT WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

- URGE IRAN TO THINK ABOUT THIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE THE WELL-BEING OF ITS PEOPLE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ITS ECONOMY,

128. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY SINGAPORE: EMBASSY SINGAPORE IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND URGE SINGAPORE TO 'SOUND THE ALARM' ON SANCTIONS TO IRAN. THREE PRIMARY OPPORTUNITIES THAT SINGAPORE WOULD HAVE TO DELIVER SUCH A MESSAGE ARE DURING PRIVATE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE MARGINS OF UNGA, DURING NAM MEETINGS, AND AT THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE. SINGAPORE CAN ALSO EMPHASIZE THAT THE NAM SHOULD NOT BE A RUBBER-STAMP FOR SUPPORT OF IRANIAN DEFIANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ENTERED INTO. KEY MESSAGES WE WOULD LIKE SINGAPORE TO DELIVER INCLUDE:

- SUPPORT IRAN'S RIGHT TO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT OBLIGATIONS IT FREELY ASSUMED.
- UNDERScore THAT WITH SUCH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
- EXPRESS CONCERN THAT, SHOULD IRAN DECIDE NOT TO ENGAGE IN A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH THE P5+1/E3+3 ABOUT ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM, IT WILL LIKELY FACE

ADDITIONAL, HARSHER SANCTIONS.

- EMPHASIZE THE BENEFITS OF ACCEPTING THE P5+1/E3+3 PACKAGE, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION,
- COOPERATION IS MUCH MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THAN ISOLATION.

¶29. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR EMBASSY ZAGREB: EMBASSY ZAGREB IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND ENCOURAGE CROATIA TO HELP 'SOUND THE ALARM' TO IRAN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL, HARSHER SANCTIONS. THIS COULD BE DONE ON THE MARGINS OF UNGA IN ITS CAPACITY AS A UNSC NON-PERMANENT MEMBER, OR IN MORE PRIVATE, BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRANIANS. KEY POINTS WE WOULD LIKE CROATIA TO MAKE INCLUDE:

- IRAN HAS RIGHTS, BUT WITH THEM COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
- THESE RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE RESPONDING TO THE LAWFUL REQUESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY INTO IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, CONSISTENT WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. URGE IRAN TO THINK ABOUT THIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO INCREASE THE WELL-BEING OF ITS PEOPLE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ITS ECONOMY.

¶30. (U) POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO REPORT ANY SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSES WITH 7 BUSINESS DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS CABLE. RISA MONGIELLO (ISN/RA, 202-736-4730), MICHAEL BEDKE (ISN/RA, 202-736-4686) AND BRECK HEIDLBERG (ISN/RA, 202-647-6599) ARE THE DEPARTMENT'S POCS FOR THIS ACTIVITY.

¶31. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.  
CLINTON